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II. DOSSIÊ 
SEX AND GENDER AND SEX 
Stephanie Lynn Budin1 
ABSTRACT 
This article challenges some of the prevailing notions pertaining to non-
binary sex and fluid gender in modern academia. Beginning with a look at the 
history of the sex vs. gender debate, it turns to the study of genetics to 
determine how binary sex is, overturning many current beliefs about the 
biological bases of multiple sexes. It then considers four case studies of so-
called fluid gender in world history—Mesopotamian women as men, 
Albanian virgjinéshē, and Indian devadāsīs and sādhini—which show that 
these apparently “male women” never lose their feminine gender in spite of 
provisional male prerogatives.  In all cases, it is their sexuality that ties them 
to their gender. The article ends with a consideration of how unreflective 
adoption of non-binary sex and fluid gender undermines the goals of 
feminism. 
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1. Introduction 
We have gone insane about sex and gender. By “we” I mean academes and 
researchers in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The problem is that we have so totally 
embraced third wave feminist and queer theory notions of non-binary sex, fluid gender, 
and non-material bodies in the name of political expediency that we have forsaken 
science, data, and reality. In the various fields of ancient studies (Assyriology, Biblical 
Studies, Classics, Archaeology, inter alia) specifically there is considerable interest in 
“ungendering” the ancient world—eschewing “modern,” “Western” notions of binary sex 
and gender so as to come to a better understanding and proof of theories that “biological” 
sex is merely conscripted gender, which itself is a construct, a performance, really. The 
ancient world was populated not by “men” and “women,” but inscribed bodies (however 
defined, if defined at all) of at least five or more sexes who performed any of a host of 
gender roles.2 To suggest otherwise is to confess one’s naïveté, or worse, one’s “phobias” 
(homophobia, transphobia, etc.). 
This essay is a small attempt to correct some of this. After a consideration of where 
the study of sex and gender currently stands in the academy, I consider two topics of 
obsession/taboo in feminist/gender/queer studies: the binary nature of biological sex and 
what it actually means for gender to be “fluid.” For this latter point, I look at four 
examples—one ancient, three modern—of females who become social males in their 
societies. As the evidence for all of these indicates, the fluidity of their gender has no 
effect on the constancy of their biological sex. This fact is highlighted by the next topic 
to which I turn: the role of sexuality in the expression of gender and sex. Not 
heterosexuality or homosexuality; just sexuality at all, full stop. It turns out that women 
(they do exist!) are far more constrained by sexuality in their gender constructions than 
men, and not necessarily in terms of reproduction. Sex makes gender constant. 
Finally, I turn to a consideration of the aims of second wave feminism. As will be 
noted below, the effort to do away with the scientific, biological “fact” of (binary) sex 
emerged from a desire to remove biological essentialism from the arsenal that could be 
 
2 To offer just a brief handful of examples ranging in discipline from prehistoric archaeology to 
Assyriology, Egyptology, Cypriot studies, Near Eastern archaeology, Aegean prehistory, and Classics: 
Knapp & Meskell (1997); Hitchcock (2000); Bahrani (2001); Asher-Greve (2002 and 2018); Ribeiro 
(2002); McCaffrey (2002); Bolger (2003); Talalay (2005); Lyons (2007); Dowson (2008); Bailey (2013); 
Dujnic Bulger & Joyce (2013); Marshall (2013); Cifarelli (2017); Helle (2018). 
Stephanie Budin. Sex and Gender and Sex. 
3 
used against women in their struggle for equal rights. But in so doing, the theorists have 
functionally denied the existence of women (and, for that matter, men). This will not help 
women (or men). Denial of a problem does not make it go away. 
 
2. Where Are We and How the Hell Did We Get Here? 
The distinction between biological sex and social/cultural gender goes back at least 
to the 1950s. Many would argue that Simone de Beauvoir’s statement “On ne naît pas 
femme: on le devient/One is not born a woman: one becomes one” (De Beauvoir, 1989, 
p. 267) was the original articulation of this notion in feminist studies (Zsolnay, 2018, p. 
464; Masterson, Sorkin Rabinowitz, Robson, & Llewellyn-Jones, 2015, p. 3; inter alia). 
However, as Toril Moi has argued, this statement refers not to the oppressive imposition 
of gender attributes typically assumed, but is a reference to de Beauvoir’s existentialist 
philosophy, whereby one achieves one’s self-identity. It is technically positive (Moi 1999, 
p. IV). 
Perhaps more in line with the modern dichotomy of sex/gender was an article 
published by John Money, Joan Hampson, and John Hampson in 1957, “Imprinting and 
the Establishment of Gender Role,” wherein the psychologist (Money) and two 
physicians studied the effects of early and disrupted gender identity on hermaphroditic 
humans, thus on individuals whose biological sexual identity could be seen as socially 
malleable. As they discovered: 
On the one hand, it is evident that gender role and orientation is not determined in 
some automatic, innate, or instinctive fashion by physical, bodily agents, like 
chromosomes, gonadal structures, or hormones. On the other hand, it is also evident 
that the sex of assignment and rearing does not automatically and mechanistically 
determine the gender role and orientation… Rather, it appears that a person’s 
gender role and orientation becomes established, beginning at a very early age, as 
that person becomes acquainted with and deciphers a continuous multiplicity of 
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signs that point in the direction of his being a boy, or her being a girl. (Money et 
al., 1957, pp. 334–335) 
This basic dichotomy lasted well into the 1970s and the rise of second wave 
feminism. As discussed by Ann Oakley in her 1972 book Sex, Gender, and Society: 
‘Sex’ is a word that refers to the biological differences between male and female: 
the visible difference in genitalia, the related difference in procreative function. 
‘Gender’ however is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification into 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine.’ (Oakley, 1972, p. 16) 
Gayle Rubin offered a similar definition in her seminal work “The Traffic in Women: 
Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex” first published in 1975: “As a preliminary 
definition, a ‘sex/gender system’ is the set of arrangements by which a society transforms 
biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed 
sexual needs are satisfied.” (Rubin, 1990, p. 34)3 Basically, sex pertained to the biological, 
the body, while gender pertained to the social and psychological (e.g. “I know I’m a girl 
so I act like a girl.”). 
Problems began to manifest in the 1990s. At one level, we simply got sloppy. 
People in all disciplines, inside the academy or not, started to use sex and gender 
interchangeably. Thus, as noted by Walker & Cook in 1998:  
The term gender began to be commonly used in the biomedical literature in the 
early 1970s by researchers interested in the relationship between a person’s sex as 
indicated by his or her karyotype and the person’s social identity… However, much 
of the recent popularity of the term gender appears to reflect a lack of understanding 
of the significance of the sex/gender distinction. With increasing frequency, gender 
 
3 See more recently Walker & Cook (1998, p. 255): “Sex refers to the anatomical or chromosomal categories 
of male and female. Gender refers to socially constructed roles that are related to sex distinctions.” 
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is being used to refer to an animal’s biological identity (in other words, its sex). 
(Walker & Cook, 1998, p. 256) 
They go on to provide data on the “slippage” of these terms in the biomedical data from 
1966–1997. Whereas from 1966–1974 only 3.39% of articles use sex and gender as 
synonyms, by 1990–1996 the percentage increased to 56.6 (Walker & Cook, 1998, p. 
259). Nowadays one hears about how doctors “assign a child’s sex/gender at birth.” 
(Asher-Greve, 2018, pp. 19 and 26)4 Not only does the doctor NOT assign a sex (which 
happened in utero), she cannot possibly assign a gender as she has no way of knowing 
how the child will develop in terms of personality and personal relationships, the core 
foundations of gender. 
By the 1990s two additional factors came to complicate the sex/gender dichotomy. 
One was the addition of sexual orientation, such that it became a determining factor in 
the establishment of one’s gender. Thus, “[o]verlaid on that set of binaries was taken, by 
the dominant culture, to be that of sexual orientation (when it was discussed at all) based 
on the sex (or is that the gender?) of the desired person.” (Masterson et al., 2015, p. 3). 
Basically, the sex:biology/gender:culture axis became a grid trying to incorporate 
differences for hetero- and homosexuality. Needless to say, with so many inputs, binary 
forms appeared unsatisfactory. 
A second complicating factor was a misunderstanding of the medical community’s 
research on sexual dimorphism. Studies pertaining to how different, say, male and female 
brains or hormones are (in humans or otherwise), or male vs. female psychology, or how 
sexually dimorphic ancient philosophers such as Aristotle believed males and females to 
be, were translated by theorists into attestations that sex itself was not binary at the 
chromosomal or genital level. Because both males and females, say, contain testosterone, 
have two legs (normally), and can display aggression, they cannot be seen as separate 
categories (in spite of the gametes they produce).5 
By the time third wave feminism was hitting its stride third wave feminists were 
arguing for the complete collapse of the sex/gender dichotomy, with gender taking the 
 
4 Money et al. (1957), do refer to such sex/gender assignments, but they are discussing hermaphrodites in 
the 1950s, when such biology was deemed “correctable.” It is hardly the norm. 
5 See especially Asher-Greve (2018) on this. 
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lead. That is to say: Independent, biological, physical sex did not really exist, it was 
merely a projection of gender. Much of the argument for this originally came from Judith 
Butler. In her 1990 publication Gender Trouble she argued that: 
If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” 
is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, 
with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no 
distinction at all. … As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender 
is also the discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is 
produced and established as “prediscursive,” prior to culture, a politically neutral 
surface on which culture acts… Indeed, sex, by definition will be shown to have 
been gender all along. (Butler, 1990, pp. 9–11) 
Her follow up in her 1993 book Bodies that Matter: 
If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access to this “sex” 
except by means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is absorbed by 
gender, but that “sex” becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, 
retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access. 
(Butler, 1993, p. 5) 
Butler was quickly followed by other third wave feminists, such as Moira Gatens 
and Elizabeth Grosz. Per Gatens: 
Significantly, the sexed body can no longer be conceived as the unproblematic 
biological and factual base upon which gender is inscribed, but must in itself be 
recognized as constructed by discourses and practices that take the body both as 
their target and as their vehicle of expression. Power is not then reducible to what 
is imposed, from above, on naturally differentiated male and female bodies, but is 
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also constitutive of those bodies, in so far as they are constituted as male and female. 
(Gatens, 1996, p. 70) 
And according to Grosz: 
These differences may or may not be biological or universal. But whether biological 
or cultural, they are ineradicable.… It is in any case not clear how one can eliminate 
the effects of (social) gender to see the contributions of (biological) sex. The body 
cannot be understood as a neutral screen, a biological tabula rasa onto which 
masculine or feminine could be indifferently projected. (Grosz, 1994, p. 18) 
Such notions entered the realm of archaeology in 1991 with the publication of Jarl 
Nordbladh and Tim Yate’s article “This Perfect Body, this Virgin Text: Between Sex and 
Gender in Archaeology”. Here they argued: 
Archaeologists writing about gender have assumed sex is an unquestionable, 
biological fact, the background to history, the synchrony against which the 
diachrony is played out. The position sex-gender would thus be equivalent to that 
of nature-culture. But biology is also a social and cultural construct, and 
demonstrates that the binary framework of the categories male-female is itself not 
originary. More categories than two do exist… and may be the subject of cultural 
elaboration. In medicine this third category — strongly hidden in our own society 
— is called the class of abnormalities, into which are collected all those who do not 
directly fit the ideal sex stereotypes… Modern medical science has developed 
several complicated methods for the determination of sex. Nevertheless, none of 
these gives a 100% division into separate classes. Several exceptions to the binary 
structure of sex have been noted. (Nordbladh & Yates, 1991, p. 224, my emphasis) 
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The division between sex and gender is, therefore, no longer guaranteed by some 
external reality, a penis or a vagina: it is itself the abstraction of a cultural system 
brought about within an historical mode of the reality principle, determined by a 
third term that allows them to divide and separate, while at the same time binding 
these differences to those ‘external’ discourses that are built up around them… The 
notion of ‘males’ and ‘females’ outside of the symbolic system presupposes 
homogeneous subjects, ‘ideal’ types that are anti-historical and indeed need 
entertain no relationship to history. (Nordbladh & Yates, 1991, pp. 233–234) 
Bringing the argument into the medical, Ann Fausto-Sterling argued that, “Our 
bodies are too complex to provide clear-cut answers about sexual difference. The more 
we look for a simple physical basis for ‘sex,’ the more it becomes clear that ‘sex’ is not a 
pure physical category” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 4). 
By the time Anne Minas Belmont was writing her 1993 work Gender Basics: 
Feminist Perspectives on Women and Men she could actually complain (with bizarrely 
little understanding of past usages), “Thus the word ‘sex’ is coming to be restricted to 
biological, or genetic male/female differences, leaving its official synonym, ‘gender,’ free 
to drift toward meaning those differences that have social causes” (Minas Belmont, 1993, 
p. 4, my emphasis). Likewise, in her 1996 article “Fleshing Gender/Sexing the Body: 
Refiguring the Sex/Gender Distinction,” Nancy Tuana cried, “Over a decade ago I argued 
that the distinction between sex and gender was pernicious and advocated that feminists 
refuse its polarization” (Tuana, 1996, p. 54). It was only a matter of time before the 
collapse entered the realm of ancient studies. In her 2005 article “The Gendered Sea: 
Iconography, Gender, and Mediterranean Prehistory” Laura Talalay argued that, “While 
these reductive definitions allow archaeologists to parse their research into tidy categories 
— sex is biologically determined, gender is socially constructed — the sex:gender 
paradigm is, in fact, no longer well supported” (Talalay, 2005, p. 131). 
Why was (and is) there so much vitriol against the notion of biological sex as 
manifest in the physical body?  Two reasons: a change in the notion of “physical body” 
and the matter of political expediency. Concerning the former, theorists specifically 
started to argue that the physical body, the complex organism through which you, I, and 
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all life forms experience life, does not actually exist. For them, the body became some 
kind of inscribed space that received social projections. As noted by Fausto-Sterling, 
“feminist theorists view the body not as essence, but as a bare scaffolding on which 
discourse and performance build a completely acculturated being” (Fausto-Sterling, 
2000, p. 6). For Tuana: 
[W]e also need to attend more carefully to the fact that in talking about male bodies 
or female bodies we refer neither to a biological entity nor to meaning, nor even to 
a combination of the two. We refer to a material-semiotic matrix, an intra-active 
process that will be mischaracterized as long as we attempt to understand it through 
the false dichotomy of sex/gender or through the related binarisms of 
biology/culture, essential/constructed. (Tuana, 1996, p. 57) 
Likewise for A. Bernard Knapp and Lynn Meskell writing in 1997, “An embodied body 
represents, and is, a lived experience where the interplay of irreducible natural, social, 
cultural and psychical phenomena are brought to fruition through each individual’s 
resolution of external structures, embodied experience, and choice” (Knapp & Meskell, 
1997, p. 186). And likewise, “The body has become the site of mapped and inscribed 
social relations, specifically regarding displays and negotiations of power as well as 
gender dynamics” (Knapp & Meskell, 1997, p. 184). 
It also turned out that bodies were politically inexpedient for the aims of feminism.6 
If any difference could be quantified between men and women, then this difference could 
be summoned to justify the subordination of women. Again to quote Tuana, “In 
continuing to make a dichotomy between nature/nurture, gene/environment, 
matter/language, feminist theorists fail to realize the radical potential of their position. 
We reify the dichotomy that will be used against us.” (Tuana, 1996, p. 62, emphases in 
original) Likewise Fausto-Sterling, who criticized second wave feminists for 
acknowledging biological differences, “[i]n ceding the territory of physical sex, feminists 
left themselves open to renewed attack on the grounds of biological difference” (Fausto-
 
6 What Klinge called “early feminist disgust of biology because of the abuse made of biology to legitimize 
social gender roles.” (Asher-Greve, 2018, p. 22) 
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Sterling, 2000, p. 4). Slightly less overt but just as political is Yvonne Marshall’s take on 
the relationship between personhood and the body: 
It is a truism to say we employ our bodies in the process of becoming persons. But 
as feminists have been at pains to establish, this does not mean there is any 
necessary or direct relationship linking a particular kind of body or body part with 
a particular form of person or personhood. (Marshall, 2013, pp. 204–205) 
And so the biological, the physical, was drummed out of the academy by third wave 
feminists on the grounds that it worked against their agenda.7 Physical sex was subsumed 
by social gender so that we might claim that any physical, sexual difference between men 
and women was merely a social construction created by a patriarchy falsely to justify the 
oppression of women. 
When this was not enough we decided to get rid of the categories of “man” and 
“woman” altogether. 
 
3. (Non-)Binary Sex 
One of the hottest trends in current feminisms, queer theory, gender studies, and 
trendy hipsterdom generally is the strict denial of binary sex (remarkably not to be 
confused with fluid gender: See the next section of this essay). The human species is not 
populated by females (girls, women) and males (boys, men). Rather there is a range, a 
continuum of sexes. 
The idea seems to have gotten its start in 1993, when Fausto-Sterling published the 
article “The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough” in The Sciences. Here 
she wrote about no fewer than three categories of humans who were not standard XX 
females or XY males, but varieties of intersex. Thus, the “herm” (a true hermaphrodite 
with one testis and one ovary), the “merm” (with a testis and some aspects of the female 
 
7 This actually was not a problem for second wave feminists. As noted by Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and 
Louise Lamphere in their “Introduction” to Woman, Culture, and Society, “Surely no one would question 
that the sexes differ in biological constitution… But observation of physical differences itself tells us little 
about the social world we live in; for humans, biology becomes important largely as it is interpreted by the 
norms and expectations of human culture and society.” (p. 4) 
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genitalia), and the “ferm” (with ovaries and some aspects of male genitalia) (Fausto-
Sterling, 1993, p. 21). These, together with “true” males and females, would account for 
her five sexes. But perhaps even these were not enough,  
For biologically speaking, there are many gradations running from female to male; 
and depending on how one calls the shots, one can argue that along that spectrum 
lie at least five sexes—and perhaps even more… Indeed, I would argue further that 
sex is a vast, infinitely malleable continuum that defies the constraints of even five 
categories. (Fausto-Sterling, 1993, p. 21)  
Although statistics were rather difficult to come by—this not being the sort of information 
one put on a job application, say—Fausto-Sterling quoted John Money of Johns Hopkins 
University, a specialist in congenital organ defects (see above), that intersexed individuals 
may constitute up to 4% of lives births (Fausto-Sterling, 1993, p. 21). Four people out of 
every one hundred you know is probably neither male nor female. 
The academy went wild. Speaking for feminists Tuana declared, “Calling us back 
to the ‘facts’ of biology, Fausto-Sterling reminds us of intersexuality. She calls attention 
to the fact that intersexuals may constitute as many as 4 percent of births, yet their 
existence has been incredibly well erased by current medical practices and completely 
denied by Western legal systems” (Tuana, 1996, p. 64). All new approaches emerged to 
uninscribe sex and gender from ancient depictions of humans. For Talalay: 
What is clear from recent scholarship is that we can no longer think of these early 
images in simple sexual terms — figures may depict males, females, perhaps some 
kind of “third gender” hybrids, intentionally ambiguous representations, or even 
images that moved in and out of traditional sexual categories. Early Mediterranean 
taxonomies appear to have embraced multiple or ambiguous genders, a kind of 
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general messiness that rubs against the grain of Western discourse. (Talalay, 2005, 
p. 146)8 
For Douglas Bailey: 
However, in light of what is now uncontroversial anthropological, sociological, and 
other social science research, the assumption that concepts such as male and female 
were static across time and space is unsupportable. Our error…. has been to 
oversimplify the ways in which people thought about identity and indeed about 
what it meant to be human… Their [figurines] use rests on  the acceptance of a third 
assumption: that there was something that was conceived of as “female” and 
another thing understood as “male” in the European Neolithic. This assumption is 
also false. Having recognized that the majority of figurines have neither male nor 
female body parts, but are asexual, sexless, of perhaps most accurately “corporeal,” 
it is less easy to accept that there were clear and stable Neolithic concepts of male 
and female. (Bailey, 2013, p. 248, my emphasis ) 
Archaeology merged with genetics merged with feminist theory to create whole new 
understandings of human biology: 
From such a standpoint, an individual’s sex would not have to conform to a 
predetermined definition or result in specific behaviours; instead sex and sexuality 
are positioned upon a spectrum unbounded by prediscursive categories… Taking 
the argument into the realms of the cellular, it has been argued that not even the 
usual genetic markers of sex are still accepted as indicating a clear biological 
distinction between the sexes. More and more evidence is summoned which shows 
that there are variations on the commonly accepted XX = female/XY = male 
 
8 See also Asher-Greve (2002, p.12); McCaffrey (2002, passim); Talalay (2000, p. 9). 
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paradigm, including XX males and XY females, and individuals with XXY, 
XXXY, and XXXXY who display male or hermaphroditic attributes…. Given this 
evidence, it is impossible to make a binary classification on the basis of the Y 
chromosome, since it cannot always explain an individual’s set of sexual organs… 
Individuals cannot be divided simply into binary groupings, because there are so 
many variations on this theme. (Knapp & Meskell, 1997, pp. 186–187, my 
emphasis.) 
Well, actually: No. In a follow-up article written with colleagues in 2000, the 
authors began with a confession that in her 1993 article “Fausto-Sterling cited a figure 
attributed to John Money that the frequency of intersexuality might be as high as 4% of 
live births, but Money responded that he never made such a claim” (Blackless et al., 2000, 
p. 151). So, the figure is groundless.9 Blackless et al. then intended to rectify the lack of 
statistics pertaining to the number of intersexed individuals in said article, where they 
came to the conclusion that intersexed individuals account for 1.728% of live births 
(2000, p. 159). So, rather than 4 friends out of 100 being intersex, between one and two 
are. Fausto-Sterling supported this claim in her book-length study published the same 
year—Sexing the Body. 
Again, the academy fell in love, and with it popular culture. In her review of the 
book psychologist Celia Moore claimed “Most people believe that there are only two sex 
categories… Yet 17 out of every 1,000 people fail to meet our assumption that everyone 
is either male or female. This is the approximate incidence of intersexuals: Individuals 
with XY chromosomes and female anatomy, XX chromosomes and male anatomy, or 
anatomy that is half male and half female” (Moore, 2000, p. 554). 
Well, actually: No. The problem is that in the book and their article Fausto-Sterling 
et al. brought together a host of categories of genetic irregularities pertaining to sex 
chromosomes and their expression on/in the human body, only a tiny sub-category of 
which actually lead to a state of intersexuality (see below). Once these non-intersex-
 
9 It doesn’t help that in her 2000 book Sexing the Body, Fausto-Sterling herself said of her 1993 article, “I’d 
intended to be provocative, but I had also been writing tongue in cheek, and so was surprised by the extent 
of the controversy the article unleashed.” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 78) 
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leading irregularities were removed from the statistics, the percentage of intersex live 
births dropped to 0.018 (Sax, 2002, p. 174). 
 
What’s Actually Happening in There? 
Humans reproduce sexually, meaning that the gametes of two separate organisms 
must combine to form a new member of the species. The cells formed via meiosis that 
combine to form a new human are sperm, which contain 23 chromosomes (22 autosomes 
plus an X or Y chromosome) with minimal cytoplasm; and eggs, which contain 23 
chromosomes (22 autosomes plus an X chromosome) and enough cytoplasm to sustain 
the new human until it can receive nutrients and gasses from the mother via the umbilical 
cord. The sperm penetrates the egg to fertilize it, meaning that the two sets of 23 
chromosomes join to form a new human with the standard 43 chromosomes, assuming 
everything goes right (which is not always the case, as we shall see). Sperm is produced 
by males, who have X and Y chromosomes; eggs are produced by females, who have 
only X chromosomes. At the level of gametes, humans are quite binary. 
It is first and foremost the X and Y chromosomes that code for whether a human 
will be female or male, although the genes on other chromosomes are also necessary for 
creating the full sexual phenotype (bodily expression). Furthermore, the genes on the X 
chromosome perform several functions other than just sex expression, including the 
formation of red blood cells and the regulation of blood clotting, regulation of copper 
levels in the body, and proper kidney, muscle and nerve functions. Basically, a human 
cannot exist without at least one X chromosome (Rodden Robinson, 2010, p. 69). By 
contrast, the tiny Y chromosome hardly has any genes at all, more than 95% of which 
code for the formation of male phenotype (WHO, 2014).10 
After fertilization, the human embryo begins in an indifferent stage, when the sex 
is not yet phenotypically expressed. In the fourth week of development the embryo 
develops a “genital ridge” near the kidneys; in the seventh week this becomes the 
“bipotential gonad”, which can form either testes or ovaries. If the embryo contains at 
least one X chromosome and no Y, two genes work together to form ovaries: the DAX1 
gene on the X chromosome and WNT4 on chromosome 1. The ovaries then produce 
 
10 As my husband jokingly put it in computer terms, Y is not code; Y is a patch. 
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estrogen which turns on other genes to form the female phenotype. If a Y chromosome is 
present, its gene called Sex-determining Region Y (aka: SRY)—also called testis-
determining factor (TDF)—turns the bipotential gonad into testes in the 10th week of 
pregnancy. These produce testosterone, which induce the formation of a male phenotype 
(WHO, 2014; Rodden Robinson, 2010, pp. 69–71). So, generally speaking, the 
combination of two X chromosomes (one from the mother, one from the father) yields a 
phenotypic female. The combination of X and Y (X from mom, Y from dad) yields a 
male. 
Two additional data are necessary to know. First, as noted above, the human body 
cannot develop without an X chromosome. In the absence of a Y chromosome (and 
sometimes in the presence of one—see below) the human body will develop as female 
(Wiener, 1999, n.p.). There is no such thing as a sex-neutral human; it is a genetic 
impossibility. Second, a gene on the X chromosome called X Inactive-Specific Transcript 
(or XIST for short) turns off all but one X chromosome in every cell that has more than 
one. So, in an XX female for example, only the genes from one of those Xs actually 
manifest, while the genes on the other X remain dormant (Rodden Robinson, 2010, pp. 
74–75). Pay attention: This is important. 
Theoretically, then, sex should easily be binary: Two types of humans produce two 
types of gametes that produce two types of humans. However, variations do occur, 
variations that have lead some biologists and many theorists and scholars of antiquity and 
otherwise to argue that sex is not so much binary as on a continuum. It is these variations 
that induced Blackless et al. to argue that the number of intersex humans (those both male 
and female, rather than either) constitutes up to 2% of live births (down from Fausto-
Sterling’s original 4%).11 These are the variations of XXY and XXXY noted by Knapp 
and Meskell inter alia that indicate that the world is not populated by XX females and 
XY males. 
Such genetic variations do, of course, exist. However, the vast majority do not 
affect the phenotypic sex of the individual in whom they appear. Most people with 
many of these variations do not even know that they have them. Let us consider some of 
these so-called “sex-benders” to see how they do or do not create a continuum of sexes. 
 
11 Several genetic disorders induce spontaneous abortion due to unviability of the embryo/fetus, so their 
numbers are not considered in such statistics. 
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Sex Chromosomal Irregularities with Minimal Phenotype Effects 
These disorders show continuity between genotype and phenotype. In other words, 
Y makes males; otherwise you get females. 
The most mild of these genetic disorders are called aneuploidy, meaning that too 
few or too many chromosomes exist. Humans are diploids (chromosomes pair, such as 
the XX in females), so having only one is a monosomy, having three or more is polysomy. 
These account for approximately half of all chromosomal anomalies in humans with a 
total frequency of 1 in 400 live births (WHO, 2014). In terms of sex, the only viable 
monosomy is Turner’s syndrome, whereby a person has only one X chromosome with no 
pairing (X0). According to the World Health Organization, this occurs in some 1:3000 
live births, and those with the disorder are born phenotypically female (WHO, 2014; 
Rodden Robinson, 2010, pp. 76–77; Sax, 2002, p. 176). These females tend to be shorter 
than their genetic make-up would otherwise suggest, and they may be subject to certain 
heart and kidney problems (Rodden Robinson, 2010, p. 77). They are also infertile insofar 
as they cannot produce viable eggs. However, with egg-donors and in vitro-fertilization, 
they can sustain pregnancy and give birth to viable offspring (Sax, 2002, p. 176).12 As 
noted in a study published in The Lancet, “A consistent feature documented in Turner’s 
syndrome is the unambiguous identification with the female sex” (Sax, 2002, p. 176). 
Nothing here is on a continuum. 
On the polysomy side is Kleinfelter syndrome, where males have one extra X 
chromosome (XXY) (WHO, 2014; Rodden Robinson, 2010, p. 76; Sax, 2002, p. 176).13 
This irregularity appears in c. 1:600 live births (WHO, 2014). Other than slightly smaller 
testes than whatever counts as normal in puberty, the only other manifestation of 
Kleinfelter syndrome is an increased rate of infertility. Otherwise, men with Kleinfelter 
have normal secondary sexual characteristics and normal sexual function. Most cases go 
undetected unless a cause for infertility is sought (Sax, 2002, p. 176). Other polysomy 
sex irregularities are XXX females, XYY males, and males with XXXY or even XXXXY. 
 
12 Personal anecdote: A family friend married a women with Turner’s Syndrome and they did, in fact, get 
an egg donor, have in vitro, and the wife had a full pregnancy and parturition. If you were to suggest to 
either of them that the wife was not “really a woman” her 6´2´´, 300-pound husband would end you in a 
cold second. 
13 Keep in mind that XIST deactivates the extra X. 
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XXX (1:1000) (Rodden Robinson, 2010, p. 76) females tend to be taller and slimmer than 
average for their populations14, and may show some mental retardation. Otherwise, their 
phenotype expresses as female, and they are fertile (Sax, 2002, p. 176) XYY males 
(1:1000) (WHO, 2014) are phenotypically male and, again, may show some signs of 
mental retardation. Otherwise, they tend to be taller than average, experience earlier 
puberty, have regular fertility, and are typically only diagnosed in searches for causes of 
behavioral problems (Sax, 2002, p. 176). As for cases of XXXY and XXXXY (as well as 
the previously mentioned XXX and XXY), recall that XIST turns off all but one of these 
extra X chromosomes. Provided the person reacts to testosterone, the phenotype is male. 
An additional, and rare, disorder that affects males is Persistant Mullerian Duct 
Syndrome, where a mutation of either the anti-Mullerian hormone (AMH) or its receptor 
fails to repress the formation of the Mullerian organs (oviducts, uterus, upper vagina). 
These organs get in the way internally, stopping the testes from descending completely, 
a condition called cryptorchidism. (Wiener, 1999, n.p.). These XY individuals have 
normal external male genitalia, and thus present as normal male phenotype in spite of the 
internal irregularities.  
 
Sex Chromosomal Irregularities Affecting Phenotype 
Here, phenotype is altered from genotype. XY leads to female phenotype, and, far 
more rarely, XX leads to male sex attributes. The most drastic bifurcation of genotype 
from phenotype is Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (CAIS, 0.076:1000) 
(Blackless et al., 2000, p. 153), an X-recessive disorder whereby the SRY gene 
translocates onto the X chromosome, causing XY individuals to develop as females 
(Wiener, 1999, n.p.). Here, XY individuals do not respond to testosterone or other 
androgens in utero but do respond to estrogens, and thus develop as females. At birth, 
they display a vagina and clitoris typical of XX females; at puberty they develop breasts 
(WHO, 2014). It is usually only at puberty, if at all, that the condition is discovered when 
the individual does not menstruate (Sax, 2002, p. 175; Blackless et al., 2000, pp. 153–
154). More recently, the condition is discovered in athletes during regulatory testing 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000, pp. 1–3). In the absence of genetic testing, these individuals 
 
14 Which is why I tend to think of it as the supermodel configuration. 
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simply appear as typical females who neither menstruate nor reproduce. Individuals with 
CAIS self-identify as female (WHO, 2014, with citations). 
The flip side of CAIS is Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH, 0.0813) (Blackless 
et al., 2000, p. 156), an autosomal recessive condition that affects both males and females. 
People with CAH lack an enzyme that the adrenal glands need for proper hormone 
generation and wind up over-producing androgens such as testosterone (WHO, 2014; 
Sax, 2002, p. 175).15 Males with the condition may experience premature puberty with 
few other symptoms. The disorder is more severe in females. For early onset female 
CAH—also called adrenogenital syndrome (AGS, 1:5000) (WHO, 2014)—a cortisol 
deficiency combined with a compensatory increase in adrenocortical hormone (ACTH) 
in utero causes the female fetus’s genitalia to malform, presenting as neither completely 
male nor female—thus, a kind of hermaphrodite (Wiener, 1999, n.p.). However, 
CAH/AGS also brings with it a host of health problems based on an inability properly to 
regulate the body’s sodium levels. Infants with AGS develop dehydration, diarrhea, 
vomiting, and lack of appetite amongst other health issues (Wiener, 1999, n.p.).16 In 
antiquity, we might understand that such individuals had a high perinatal death rate, 
removing them from the general population and construction of sex/gender identity. 
Nevertheless, CAH is the leading cause of sexual ambiguity in humans (Wiener, 1999, 
n.p.). 
Far, far milder in effect is Late Onset Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (LOCAH). 
With LOCAH the enzyme disorder does not manifest until late childhood through early 
adulthood, and thus does not affect the formation of sexual attributes (primary or 
secondary). Males with the condition probably have no idea that they do, as the main 
symptom in males is thinning scalp hair, otherwise known as male-pattern baldness, and 
even that only affects 50% of men with LOCAH. Generally, the lack of symptoms causes 
their condition to go undiagnosed (Sax, 2002, p. 176). The average age of presentation in 
females is 24 years, and if symptoms present they are minimal menstruations, hirsutism, 
acne, and decreased fertility, assuming that they show any symptoms at all.17 It is the last 
symptom that causes most female sufferers to be diagnosed. One final possible attribute 
of LOCAH is cliteromegaly (a large clitoris). A study of 220 women with LOCAH 
 
15 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services website: “Congenital adrenal hyperplasia”. 
16 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services website: “Congenital adrenal hyperplasia”. 
17 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services website: “Congenital adrenal hyperplasia”. 
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reported that 10% had a mild form of cliteromegaly, with no examples of moderate or 
severe forms (so, no, you’re not going to mistake that clitoris for a penis) (Sax, 2002, p. 
176, with citations). LOCAH is not an intersexing/hermaphrodizing condition. 
Nevertheless, this one disorder constitutes 1.5 of the 1.728% of live birth intersexuals 
documented by Blackless et al. (2000, p. 159). Do the math. 
True hermaphroditism is marked by the possession of one ovary and one testis. 
According to John Wiener: 
There is a great diversity of phenotypes and karyotypes among true hermaphrodites. 
The majority are 46, XX and phenotypically female, but the prevalence of these 
findings may have geographical differences. The phenotype is the result of interplay 
between hormonal products from both ovarian and testicular tissue. Testicular 
tissue is invariable present by definition, but the genetic signal for testicular 
development varies. Some cases have a Y chromosome in all cells whereas others 
have mosaicism18 with the Y chromosome present in gonadal tissue only. SRY may 
be present in the absence of the Y chromosome via translocation or may be absent 
altogether. The presence of ovarian tissue in true hermaphrodites possessing the Y 
chromosome or SRY suggests that some gene products must be capable of blocking 
SRY from switching on testicular development in some gonads. (Wiener, 1999, 
n.p.) 
Because such individuals are “corrected” at birth (usually to female, per the above), it is 
difficult in modern times to determine how the phenotype will be expressed at puberty 
and into adulthood (although see Money et al., 1957, on this). The number of such 
individuals is also extremely low. According to Blackless et al., there are no published 
statistics of individuals born with both testicular and ovarian tissue (Blackless et al., 2000, 
 
18 “Mosaicism” has nothing to do with tesserae. It is a genetic condition in which a single body contains 
cells with different genetic codes, typically the result of developmental aneuploidy. Sex chromosome 
mosaics are the most common in humans, whereby some cells of the body contain X0, others XXX or 
XXY.” (Rodden Robinson, 2010, p. 232) 
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p. 157).19 Nevertheless, they suggest that true hermaphrodites constitute 0.0117 per 1000 
live births worldwide, with strong geographic concentrations, such as southern Brazil and 
southern Africa (Blackless et al., 2000, p. 159; Wiener, 1999, n.p.). Hermaphroditism 
tends to run in families (Blackless et al., 2000, p. 159). 
An additional matter should be kept in mind. Epigenetic developments are relevant 
here, whereby the environment influences how genes express. A simple example is the 
way that smoking can drastically increase one’s potential for lung cancer regardless of 
one’s genetic code. The modern environment is toxic, with people now commonly eating 
factory farmed meats loaded with artificial hormones and prophylactic antibiotics, both 
of which have an effect on the human body. Air is filled with particulates, water as well, 
with a recent severe increase in plastic. Certain prescription drugs can also affect the 
development of fetuses, leading to sex-affected disorders (e.g. exposing pregnant women 
to the drug finasteride can impair sexual development in the male fetus) (Wiener, 1999, 
n.p.). It is possible, then, that the rate of sex-affecting and intersexing conditions was 
lower in the ancient world than it is today, making it even less likely that the ancients saw 
a continuum of sexes. 
Most important, “past people did not see each other as genes but as bodies in the 
world...”(Sofaer, 2013, p. 230). With the inability to check out each other’s genotypes, 
ancient people based their assessments of sex identity on phenotype, just like we do most 
of the time today (I find I tend to be called “Ms.” before anyone has asked me about my 
chromosomes). The vast majority of conditions discussed by Fausto-Sterling and 
Blackless et al. have no effect on an individual’s phenotype. People with CAIS present 
as female. The single most common “intersex” condition is LOCAH, which rarely 
presents with any symptoms at all. Classic CAH (not late onset) can masculinize a female 
and render the genitalia ambiguous, but it comes with a host of other ailments that, in 
antiquity, would have probably killed most infants with the disorder. Even with diagnosis 
and treatment, the syndrome still only affects 0.077 people out of 1000 (Blackless et al., 
2000, p. 159). Because of the importance of the X chromosome for human development, 
female is the default sex of humans in general and individuals with most sex-oriented 
genetic disorders in particular, such that neutral is not a possibility, and hermaphroditic 
odd. True hermaphrodites, possessing both male and female reproductive organs, 
 
19 See also WHO (2014), with additional references. 
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constitute at best 0.0012% of live births, worldwide, concentrated in areas that were/are 
not Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Mediterranean. Thus, to quote Leonard Sax, “The 
available data support the conclusion that human sexuality is a dichotomy, not a 
continuum. More than 99.98% of humans are either male or female.” (Sax, 2002, p. 177). 
Human genetic sex is basically binary; human phenotype is sexually dimorphic. So 
much is evident in the osteological remains used by physical anthropologists to sex 
ancient peoples from archaeological sites, thus providing the raw data for both biological 
sex and social gender. As noted by Joanna Sofaer: 
Humans are sexually dimorphic (show differences in form between males and 
females). The extent of sexual dimorphism varies between populations but allows 
for assessment of sex on the basis of morphological characteristics of the skeleton, 
in particular the pelvis and skull. These are generally considered the most reliable 
areas for sex determination, the former reflecting functional differences between 
men and women related to childbirth. (Sofaer, 2013, p. 228) 
 
4. Fluid-Gender 
While the facts of human reproduction render the human body sexually binary and 
phenotypically dimorphic (egg-producer or sperm-producer, as is the case with all 
vertebrates), gender, the social construct, can be quite fluid. But it must be recalled that 
there are two aspects to gender: the personal performance and the socially mandated. Any 
individual is free to perform his/her gender to his/her heart’s content, be it crying at the 
movies or asking for directions20 or wondering if tonight’s date will end in sex. 
However, it has recently been recognized that this “performance of self” is heavily 
influenced by intersectionality. Intersectionality is a term originally coined in 1989 by 
 
20 Personal anecdote: When I was attending the second Gender and Methodology in the ANE Workshop in 
Helsinki in 2014, I and a group of panelists got lost on the way to the university the first day. I asked a local 
for directions, and we arrived in fine form. At lunch, I mentioned this to a male colleague, joking how it 
was a good thing that I’m female and can ask for directions! He replied that, of course, he could never do 
such a thing. 
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Kimberlé Crenshaw of Columbia University to refer to the intersection of sex, gender, 
race, and class when understanding members of any given society. How any individual 
male or female behaves will only partly be determined by sex or gender and will also be 
affected by race, affluence, ethnicity, residence, religion, and education. A middle-class, 
white, urban, liberal, atheist, heterosexual, female vegan with a Ph.D. in the humanities 
will probably “perform” more like a middle-class, black, urban, liberal, agnostic, 
homosexual, male vegetarian with a Master’s degree than either will with a lower-class, 
black, suburban, conservative Christian, high-school educated woman with a bucket of 
fried chicken in the car to feed her kids. Gender itself will only get you so far. 
It is far more difficult to escape any given society’s ideas of what is appropriate for 
a male or a female. No female politician can escape being judged on the height of her 
heels or whether she wears a skirt (what length?) or a pantsuit (is she trying to deny her 
femininity?). Writing on being a teenager in the USA in the 1960s, newspaper columnist 
Dave Barry recalls: 
In my late teens, I started to wear my hair longer—nothing extreme, pretty much 
the look favored by Moe of the Three Stooges—and when I was out in public, you’d 
have thought I was having unprotected sex with a llama right there on the sidewalk. 
People would laugh at me, or give me dirty looks and call me a hippie, or ask each 
other in a loud, self-amused voice——I can’t tell you how many times I heard this 
hilarious question—“Is that a boy or a girl?” (Har! Good one!)  Middle-aged guys 
in trucks would slow down next to me, roll down their windows, and scream 
“FAGGOT!” (Barry, 1998, p. 115) 
In December of 1993, Nebraska (USA), the transgender Brandon Teena (formerly Teena 
Brandon) was gang raped and later murdered by locals who did not accept his adoption 
of male identity—a story dramatized in the movie Boys Don’t Cry. 
Gender fluidity is thus constrained by society. In what follows I consider three 
examples of apparently fluid gender, where biological females adopt masculine gender.21 
 
21 There are, of course, plenty examples of males adopting female gender, too. These examples just happen 
to be in my own area of research. 
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One example comes from the ancient Near East, the other two from modern Albania and 
India. As the evidence at least for the latter two shows, gender remains constrained by 
sex, and most especially by sex (by which I mean eroticism). 
 
MUNUS ù NITAḪ 
Below are presented eight examples of legal gender-bending from the Hurro-
Mesopotamian cultural orbit (for a complete list of such documents, see Yamada 2014 
and 2016). The oldest one (an outlier) comes from Karum Kaneš, ancient Kültepe, 
Turkey, an Old Assyrian trading colony; the other seven come from the cities of Emar 
(Tell Meskene, northern Syria) and Nuzi (Yorghan Tepe and Kirkurk, Kurdistan) and date 
to the late Bronze Age. Seven are last wills and testaments of the pater familias, and one 
is a record of adoption. Each presents an example of females being given male 
gender/status, either by having a wife or daughter declared to be “father and mother,” 
“female and male,” or having a daughter adopted as a son. 
 
Karum Kaniš, 20th century 
Kt o/k 196c, last will and testament of Agua (Michel, 2000, pp. 2–3, trans. Michel, my 
translation from the French): 
Agua’s testament is thus: “The house in Aššur is that of my wife. Concerning the 
silver, she will share it with my children. Concerning the silver, her portion of the 
inheritance, she is father and mother (abat ù ummat). The house and the silver, 
her inheritance, and also all that she owns will then belong to Šu-Belum. The house 
in Aššur belongs to Šu-Belum. My sons will reimburse my creditors, and whatever 
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Emar, c. 13th century 
RA 71/1: Last will and testament of Zikri-Dagan, son of Ibni-Dagan: 
From this day Zikri-Dagan, son of Ibni-Dagan, in good health has gathered his 
brothers. He spoke thus: 
I have here established my daughter Unara as a woman and a man (Unara 
DUMU.MUNUS-ia ana MUNUS ù NITAḪ aškunši). May she invoke my gods 
and my ancestors. May my three sons—Adda the eldest, Dagan-Bali, and Ba’l-
limi—support their mother Unara.22 Whoever among my three sons does not 
support their mother, he will have no right to his part of the inheritance. 
While their mother lives the inheritance will not be claimed. Whoever claims his 
inheritance will have no right to the inheritance: May he pay seventy shekels of 
silver, the wife’s terḫatu, and may he go where he will. 
When their mother dies, then my three sons will acquire my house, fields, all my 
property, all my goods, and may they share the house that belongs to both as 
brothers…. (Justel, 2008, p. 264, my translation from the Spanish)23 
HANE/M 2 57, Last will and testament of Iddi-ma: 
From this day Iddi-ma, son of Zu-Ašdi, has gathered his brothers, has set the fate 
of his household and of his daughter the qadištu. 
“Baliya, my daughter, the qadištu, is father and mother of my household 
(DUMU.MUNUS-ia <NU>.GIG a-bu ù um-mu ša É-ia ši-it). I have given to my 
 
22 Either Zikri-Dagan has formally made Unara the guardian of the three boys, thus their “mother”, or Zikri-
Dagan is actually their grandfather, but is treating them like sons. 
23 See also Ben-Barak (1988, p. 94). 
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daughter Baliya, the qadištu, these objects: a bed and its covers, a bronze vessel of 
400 (shekels’) weight, a shekel of silver, an asallu vessel of 300 (shekels’) weight, 
a three-year-old cow. And I declare that Baliya will give these goods to her daughter 
Ete; Ete’s brothers will not make a claim (against her) concerning these goods….  
While Baliya lives, they will have no rights to the inheritance.” (Justel, 2014, pp. 
129–130, my translation from the Spanish) 
Emar 6 31, last will and testament of Ḫaya, son of Ipqi-Dagan: 
[Bef]ore Šaḫurunuwa, son of Šarri-Kušuḫ, king of Ka[rkemi]š, Ḫaya, son of Ipqi-
Dagan, has created this contract regarding his household. He has established his 
daughter Dada, the ḫarīmtu, as father and mother (ana abbūti u ummūti) of the 
household. 
(So speaks Ḫaya): “I have bestowed upon my daughter fDada a bed with its sheets, 
… and a bronze headboard that covered the top (of the bed); these objects as well 
as two slaves, Au-milki and Ašti-… 
I have adopted as sons my two daughters Dagan-niwari and Abi-qiri 
(DUMU.MUNUS-ia GAL ana DUMU.NITA-ia etepuššunu). I have given Dagan-niwari 
as wife to Alal-abu.  If [Dagan-niwari does not bear offspring], Alal-abu shall take 
another wife. 
May my daughters honor their father and mother Dada. If anyone of my 
daughters decides not to honor Dada, their father and mother, [she will not have 
the right] to her portion of the inheritance. May she take her clothing from the chair 
and go wherever she wishes. If they honor their father and mother, when (Dada) 
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di[es] my two daughters will acquire my property and divide up the household and 
all my possessions equally. (Justel, 2014, p. 131, my translation from the Spanish) 
HCCT-E 37, Last will and testament of Muzzazu, son of Šumanu: 
From this day, Muzzazu, son of Šamanu, willingly has fixed the destiny of his 
house. He speaks thus: 
My wife Ḫepate is father and mother of my household. I have established my 
daughter Al-ḫati as woman and man (Al-ḫati DUMU.MUNUS-ia ana MUNUS ù 
NITAḪ aškunši). May she invoke my gods and my ancestors. I have bequeathed all 
my goods, all that I have to my daughter Al-ḫati. 
If my wife Ḫepate leaves the house for that of another (man), may she leave her 
clothes on the stool and go where she will. 
If my daughter Al-ḫati dies with no offspring, then may her husband Aḫu-yaqaru 
take another wife; the sons that she bears—before and after—will be my sons. And 
if Al-ḫati and Aḫu-yaqaru die without progeny, then Al-ummi and Patil will inherit. 
(Justel, 2014, pp. 131–132, with citations, my translation from the Spanish)24 
TBR 74, adoption contract of Ba’al-wapi, son of Abbanu: 
Thus has said Ba’al-Wapi, son of Abbanu, son of Ella: 
“I have adopted Tae, son of Ili-Da, [as] my son, and made my eldest daughter 
Šamaš-la’i my son (DUMU.MUNUS-ia GAL ana DUMU.NITA-ia etepušši), and given 
her to him [as] wife.  As long as his father Ba’al-wapi and his mother Aštar-kimi 
 
24 See also Ben-Barak (1988, p. 93) for additional text. 
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live, Tae shall honor us. If he honors us, whenever we die…  [Šamaš-la’i] has no 
progeny; all [the children] she bears shall share my goods and property among 
themselves.  Concerning Šamaš-la’i: The gods belong to the main household. 
…. 
As long as his wife Šamaš-la’i lives, Tae shall not take [another] wife; if he does, 
this document shall prevail. And if Šamaš-la’i dies, may Tae take whomever of my 
remaining daughters. (Justel, 2014a, p. 70) 
 
Nuzi, c. 13th century 
IM 6818, last will and testament of Unap-tae, son of Taya: 
Testament of Unap-Tae, son of Taya. I have established a testament in favor of my 
daughter Šilwaturi. Thus Unap-tae: 
I have adopted my daughter Šilwaturi as a son/into sonship (DUMU-SAL-ia mî 
Šilwaturi ana mārūti DÙuš). All my fields, my houses, all my earning, my 
acquisitions, my slaves… my inheritance, all in Alsa and the cities of Anzukalli, 
Unzuri, Takurrampe, or in Matiḫa… to Šilwaturi, my daughter whom I have 
made as a son, I have given. (Lion, 2009, p. 10; Ben-Barak, 1988, pp. 91–92; 
Paradise, 1980, p. 189)25 
YBC 5142, last will and testament of Pui-tae, son of Wullu: 
[Will of Pui-tae s]on of W[ullu].  He made a will in favor of Watilla (f.), of … (f.), 
of Uriš-elli (f.), and in favor of Ašte (f.), daughter of …  Thus declared Pui-tae: 
 
25 See also Justel (2014, pp. 132–133) for additional clauses of the will. 
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These [my] three d[aughters] I have given the status of sons (3 
[DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia] ana mārūti epēšu). All my fields, buildings, miscellaneous 
property, I have given to these my daughters. 
….. 
Thus further declared Pui-tae: 
If Ašte dies, then whoever among my daughters is holding fields, my buildings, and 
is remaining in my house, shall serve the gods and my spirits…. (Paradise, 1987, 
pp. 203–204) 
As noted by Masamichi Yamada, the designation “father and mother” is generally 
used when the pater familias designates his wife (occasionally daughter, as was the case 
with Dada) as the head of household upon his death. The “woman and man” clause, by 
contrast, appears when the father makes a daughter his primary heir (Yamada, 2016, p. 
136), and “ana mārūti epēšu” appears when the father designates one or more daughters 
as heirs. In this final usage, one can argue that the daughters are given a new gender, as 
they made to be “sons.” In the other instances, the woman involved now has both genders: 
She is either “female and male” or “father and mother.” It is likely that the daughters-
turned-sons were similar, and were understood to be both daughters and sons 
simultaneously. 
In all cases, the gender adjustment is enacted by a male authority figure—a (dying) 
father or husband. The purpose of the adjustment appears to be twofold: to allow wives 
and daughters to enjoy the inheritance rights of males, and to permit women to take over 
the ancestral cult. In RA 71/1 and HANE/M 2 57 it is stated at the outset that the testator 
has brought the matter before his brothers. By endowing a daughter with male gender, the 
father keeps the paternal uncles from claiming the paternal estate from her. In RA 71/1 
Zikri-Dagan also pushes three sons behind his daughter Unara, who may be the mother 
of the boys. In this way, the estate neither falls back to the uncles nor skips Unara. The 
desire for a female inheritor appears whether there are potential male inheritors or not. 
Thus, Unara as noted above; as well as the wife of Agua, who inherits before her sons; 
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and Šamaš-la’i, who inherits along with her adopted brother-cum-husband Tae. In other 
cases, it appears that the testator is dying with no male heirs and thus makes some, as is 
clearly the case with Dada the ḫarīmtu, who is father and mother to her younger sisters, 
who are made sons. A similar dynamic appears with the daughters of Pui-tae. Ašte seems 
to be the oldest of three sisters-turned-sons; when she dies, another of the sisters will take 
over the family property and the ancestral cult. Šilwaturi appears to be an only child. 
Four documents make it clear that the daughter will take over the ancestral cult, a 
privilege/responsibility normally accorded to the oldest son: RA 71/1, where Zikri-Dagan 
has Unara invoke his gods and ancestor; HCCT-E 37, where Muzzazu has his daughter 
Al-ḫati do the same; TBR 74, where it appears that Ba’al-wapi places his daughter 
Šilwaturi in charge of the household cult; and YBC 5147, where Pui-tae declares that 
whichever daughter should succeed Ašte will also “serve the gods and my spirits…” The 
gender adjustment, then, gives the females under consideration legal, economic, and 
religious rights recognizable within the community. 
This apparent fluidity of gender, though, has no impact upon the women’s sex. With 
two exceptions, Baliya the qadištu and Dada the ḫarīmtu, it is written into several wills 
that the daughters-tuned-sons will marry and have children. A qadištu is a cult functionary 
who is not supposed to reproduce sexually, but who may adopt a child, and it is possible 
that Ete is Baliya’s adopted daughter, whose own children are in line for the family 
inheritance. It is unknown why Dada is a ḫarīmtu, a women with neither father nor 
husband. Her ḫarīmtu status may come from the fact that the father in question is dying 
(thus a will) and that there appears to be no intention to marry her off. By contrast, Ḫaya 
clearly states that his daughter (and son) Dagan-niwari is already betrothed, and it is 
possible that the youngest sister is also expected to marry. Otherwise, Al-ḫati is already 
married per the will, and Šamaš-la’i is actively engaged to her adopted brother in the 
contract. 
As is typical for widows (“fathers” and otherwise), the wills complicate their ability 
to remarry (and thus potentially remove property from the paternal line). Even though 
Muzzazu has made Ḫepate father and mother of the household, he leaves his inheritance 
to their daughter while proclaiming, “If my wife Ḫepate leaves the house for that of 
another (man), may she leave her clothes on the stool and go where she will.” The wife 
of Agua is also father and mother of the household, but control over the property is still 
handed over to Šu-Belum and, after, their sons. Male gender does not give wives any 
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individual right to their husbands’ property, and the inheritance tends to be regulated to 
the third generation, to the potential sons of the sonly daughters (who, again, are expected 
to marry and have children). 
It is ultimately impossible to know how the women involved experienced or 
performed this adjustment to their gender. The ability to care for the family cult would 
have probably given a sense of agency denied to “normal” women, as would, to some 
extent, the economic rights acquired and responsibility over (younger) siblings. But their 
female sex is never disputed—the women have occupations and designations reserved 
exclusively for women (qadištu, ḫarīmtu), and they are expected to marry and become 
mothers. And there is no evidence whatsoever that such women are expected to take on 
any other aspects of masculine gender (e.g. dress, masculine name, a female wife). 
 
Virgjinéshē—The Sworn Virgins of Albania 
Documented ethnographically since the 19th century, but probably dating back into 
the 15th, are the so-called “sworn virgins” of Albania and immediately surrounding 
Balkan regions. These virgjinéshē are women who adopt masculine gender and live their 
lives as males, thus becoming social men. This adoption of masculine gender includes 
dressing in male clothing (including the modern donning of sunglasses); (usually) 
adopting a male name (Young, 2000, p. 62); acquiring masculine body language, 
postures, and behaviors (Young, 2000, p. 98); engaging in male labor such as ploughing, 
chopping wood, scything, harvesting, watering and maintaining irrigation systems, and 
protecting animals and property (as opposed to female work, which includes cooking, 
handicrafts, and all heavy lifting and carrying); serving as a host to guests—talking to 
visitors and drinking and smoking with them; as well as defending family honor, even to 
the death in one of the bloodfeuds for which the region is (in)famous (Young, 2000, pp. 
32 and 57). “Furthermore as part of their masculinized attitudes, ‘sworn virgins’ would 
feel dishonoured by speaking about their feelings and emotions; it would damage their 
reputations as honourable men.” (Young, 2000, p. 58) Equally critical for the social 
gender switch is the vow (besa) (Young, 2000, p. 42) of virginity/chastity which the 
women must make in the presence of twelve (male) village elders of the dominant religion 
(Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic) (Dickemann, 1997, p. 200), an action 
which biological males, obviously, are not required to make to be considered men. 




There is a considerable variety of titles given to this gender-bending category 
partially due to the variety of languages used in the region and partially to the various 
ways these women are understood. According to René Grémaux: 
By virtue of their vow to lead a virginal life, such persons were referred to as 
zavjetovana djevojka, in the local Slavic vernacular, and as vajzē e betuar, in the 
Albanian counterpart, both meaning “sworn virgin.” More often, however, these 
individuals are designated tobelija (“person bound by a vow”) or virgjinéshē 
(“female committed to virginity”)… [o]ther nouns, such as the South Slavic 
muskobanja (“manlike woman”), stress overt masculinity. (Grémaux, 1994, p. 244) 
For Mildred Dickemann, these women are: in Albanian verginesha (virgin or unmarried 
woman); Montenegrin harambasha (woman-man); Southern Serbian mushkobane 
(manly woman), tombelije or tobelije (from Turkish, one who forswears betrothal), 
ostajnica (one who stays [in the paternal household]), zena covjek (woman-man) 
(Dickemann, 1997, p. 200). In all instances, certain consistent aspects of lifestyle are 
emphasized. All of these women swear a besa never to marry or to engage in sexual 
intercourse—thus, perpetual virgins. The besa taken leads to terms such as 
tobelija/tombelije, while their adoption of masculine dress, behavior, and gender in 
general renders such terms as muskobanja/muskobane and zena covjek. The fact that this 
unmarried female remains in the paternal estate rather than engaging in patrilocal 
marriage is the explanation for ostajnica.   
It should be noted, though, that such terminology is an etic usage: The sworn virgins 
do not use it of themselves. As Antonia Young observed in the midst of her fieldwork in 
northern Albania in the late 20th century, “Despite the use by writers of various terms for 
‘sworn virgins’, I never met one who applied any of the terms to themselves, preferring 
their self-perceptions simply to be prestigious men. However, most would not deny their 
transition from having been female” (Young, 2000, p. 62). 
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History 
The earliest attestation of these sworn virgins appears in the Kanuni i Lekë 
Dukagjinit (Laws of Lek Dukagjini—14th century) (Young, 2000, p. 2), the main body of 
north Albanian oral law that was collected and codified in the early twentieth century by 
the Franciscan friar Shtjefën Gjecovi (d. 1929). Article 42 of this corpus claims that a 
young man is free to reject his family’s choice of bride, immediately followed by a clause 
that forbids a girl, under penalty of death, from abandoning her proposed betrothed. 
However, with her parents’ approval, she has the option of avoiding the marriage by 
swearing to remain unwed in perpetuity. “Becoming a ‘sworn virgin’ was therefore the 
only respectable option for a girl who refused to get married, and the only way of avoiding 
a subsequent blood-feud between the families concerned” (Grémaux, 1992, p. 368). 
More data on the sworn virgins comes from the 15th-century Kanun of Skanderberg 
(Young, 2000, p. 2). Here it is stated that the virgjinéshē should sit in the place of honor 
typically reserved for the head of household, both beside the hearth and at the sofra (low 
table on which meals are served to those sitting on the floor). The Skanderberg Kanun 
also allows for a woman to take the besa purely by choice, although it strongly advises 
that she get the permission of her parents and relatives, as these are the individuals who 




There are various reasons why a female would choose to forego matrimony, 
motherhood, sexuality, and femininity in this ethnic context. In addition to the desire to 
get out of an undesirable marriage, it is very often the case that the family in question 
finds itself without a male heir, either because sons were not born to the family or all sons 
have died. This provokes a considerable crisis in the household, as noted by Grémaux, 
“In everyday life, parents who failed to produce a son suffered a loss of status or 
downright ostracism.” (Grémaux, 1994, p. 268)26 In such an instance, the family may, 
with or even without the consent of the female involved, make the besa on behalf of the 
female dedicated, and thus change her social gender to male (Young, 2000, pp. 4 and 15). 
 
26 See also Young (2000, p. 57). 
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If the girl is very young when the besa is made on her behalf, she will be raised as a boy, 
never experiencing female gender at all. 
In between these extremes are cases where a family with at least one male heir loses 
him to death in war, bloodfued, or illness. In such cases parents might call upon a daughter 
to make the vow on their behalf, and thus provide a surrogate “male” line through which 
to pass the paternal estate. The situation becomes even more dire when the pater familias 
has died with no male heir but a surviving widow. As sonless widows have no right to 
remain in the husband’s house(hold), they must either return to their natal family or 
remarry quickly, both actions bringing a considerable loss of status to the woman 
involved (Dickemann, 1997, pp. 98–99). In such a case a daughter becoming a son 
safeguards the status and security of the mother. Furthermore, a female who has violently 
lost brothers might become a man in order to avenge the victim and thus the family 
(Young, 2000, p. 61). 
There are more personal reasons why a female might chose to become a sworn 
virgin. The flip side of getting out of a bad marriage without being murdered is the 
potential of staying with one’s natal family in one’s own home. Both Grémaux and 
Dickemann mention the sworn virgin Stana Cerovic who took the vow in order to remain 
by her father’s side. As she herself declared, “When I grew up I told my father that I 
would be his son. I took an oath never to marry or to abandon his house as long as I live” 
(Dickemann, 1997, p. 199; Grémaux, 1994, p. 261). Virgins without brothers have the 
opportunity to become heads of household, giving them life-time possession of the family 
property and home (Young, 2000, pp. 42–43). They also have greater freedom in choosing 
(non-sexual) life partners, and thus might remain side-by-side with siblings—and have a 
say in the marriage of sisters!—or make connections with “blood sisters” with whom they 
are free to live (Dickemann, 1997, p. 199). And, ultimately, the extremely patriarchal 
nature of Albanian society renders life for women rather hellish (from an American 
perspective, at least). To become socially male allows for many freedoms and privileges. 
As noted by Young, “In fact the taking of a male role by women in these specifically 
defined situations in their own country is not only acceptable and highly commendable, 
but is a choice of a better life — often actively made by these women themselves” 
(Young, 2000, p. 7). 
In the end, then, there are generally recognized to be two main types of sworn 
virgins: Those who make the choice for themselves after having experienced at least part 
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of their lives as females, and those who were dedicated to maleness from birth, known as 
the vajze e betuar (Young, 2000, pp. 60–61; Grémaux, 1994, p. 244). 
According to the rules of the vajze e betuar, a daughter will be brought up in 
preparation to become the household head. In this role she will be permitted 
eventually to inherit the home and property which, according to customary law is 
not permissible in any other circumstances for a woman. (Young, 2000, pp. 60–61) 
The tradition of the sworn virgin is not yet in decline. When doing his field work in 
Albania in the 1980s Grémaux knew of some 120 sworn virgins over the course of the 
previous century, and Young records that the tradition is spreading into urban areas as 
Albania slowly modernizes (Grémaux, 1994, p. 242). 
 
Socially Male 
Members of the sworn virgins’ communities are basically willing to accept their 
masculine identities—that they are recognized as men. It is not merely that the virgjinéshē 
are granted special honors within the household and perform “male” labor. They are 
accepted in various categories of all-male communities, including, notably, the military. 
Thus one of the earliest attested sworn virgins was an individual named Mikas Milicev 
Karadzic, first noted in 1885 in the Montenegrin village of Zabljak by a Serbian doctor 
who was examining the 22-year old soldier in the national army. Originally a girl named 
Milica, her father, a celebrated hero, died in battle when she was a child. Milica’s mother 
dressed her as a boy and raised her as male, and thus began her life as a sworn virgin 
(Grémaux, 1994, pp. 246–247). While Mikas’s presence stunned the doctor, her fellow 
soldiers were perfectly aware of her biological sex. 
In the local community Mikas was addressed by females with terms such as djever 
(“husband’s brother”), svekar (“father-in-law”) and kum (“godfather” or “elderly man”). 
In official documents, Mikas was registered as a male, which enabled her to vote in 
parliamentary elections at a time when female suffrage did not yet exist. When she died 
in 1934, Mikas was laid out in male garb and buried as a man in the Zabljak churchyard 
with the full approval of the Orthodox priest (Grémaux, 1994, pp. 150 and 153). 
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Not long after, the virgin Tonē Bikaj (d. 1971 at the age of 70) joined the nationalist 
guerilla movement where she commanded an all-male resistance fighters’ unit. This Tonē 
was the oldest of five children—three girls who lived, two boys who died. When nine 
years old she decided to become a boy, promising never to marry, cutting her hair, and 
adopting male clothing—only keeping her feminine name. She received weapons from 
her father at age 15, and her extended family and tribe universally accepted her as a male 
(Grémaux, 1994, pp. 253-254). It thus came as a surprise and considerable 
disappointment that when captured by the enemy she was treated as a woman during her 
year-long period of incarceration. 
More recently, an urban sworn virgin named Medi interviewed by Young trained 
to be a police officer in the capital city of Tirana, following in the footsteps of her father 
(and in complete contradistinction from any female previously). Like other sworn virgins, 
“She walked, with her hands in her pockets along in the streets (also unheard of for young 
women in such a tradition-oriented town) and frequented cafes to smoke and drink with 
men” (Young, 2000, p. 88). 
Remarkably, sworn virgins are permitted to fulfill religious functions as males, 
including, as was the case in Emar and Nuzi, of maintaining the family cult of ancestors. 
In Albania having sons “is essential for life after death, since he is the one who will take 
care of your soul; and it is always the son who carries on with the life of your household; 
he also inherits the property, goes to war, defends you, and also avenges you.” One 
anthropologists cited by Young, “spoke of a man who believed there was no way to be 
allowed entry into Heaven without a son, essential for life after death in order to take care 
of the deceased’s soul.” Nevertheless, these religious obligations of a son could be 
fulfilled by a sworn virgin in the absence of male offspring (Young, 2000, pp. 15 and 30, 
with citations). 
There is some debate as to the extent to which sworn virgins could, in fact, take on 
a man’s obligations in the event of a family bloodfeud. Unlike females, the sworn virgin 
took up arms and was expected to engage in violence. As such, she could be treated 
socially as a man, and kill and be killed (Young, 2000, p. 138). However, Grémaux 
counters that: 
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Unlike ordinary females, who were unarmed, the female who became a social male 
could be completely armed and actively take part in feuds, raids and the like. Yet 
intentionally killing or wounding such a person while in full awareness of the fact 
that she was a female by nature was considered shameful and unworthy of a genuine 
hero… I have the impression that in general these social males retained the 
immunity conferred by their female sex or their former gender. This allowed them 




And so comes the matter of gender ambiguity: Sworn virgins are not 100% accepted 
as males. For example, Grémaux reports of that soldier Mikas that:  
All my informants stressed Mikas’s striking masculinity in spirit, appearance and 
behavior, as well as his fierce insistence on being treated and respected as a genuine 
male… Mikas is said to have always used the male gender when talking about 
himself. 
However: 
Talking about Mikas, my informants alternately used “he” and “she,” as was also 
observed by Gusic when Mikas was still alive.  In his presence, however, nobody 
would have had the insolence to call him a woman, although everyone in Jezera 
knew that he was a biological female… (Grémaux, 1994, p. 251) 
When the military commander Tonē died she was buried in masculine fashion. 
However, in keeping with a masculine funeral several male relatives and friends wanted 
 
27 See also Young (2000, p. 99). 
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to perform the vajtim in Tonē’s honor—a traditional, impromptu lament sung in verse. 
They were forbidden from doing so by the priest, as it was not the custom of Tonē’s tribe 
for biological females to be publically lamented by males (Grémaux, 1994, p. 256). 
Sometimes the problem is a matter of genuine male ego, as was the case for Stana 
Cerovic. At a shooting competition where Stana was a supposedly passive observer, she 
lost her patience with all the male competitors who apparently couldn’t hit the broad side 
of a barn from the inside. Grabbing a rifle she entered the ranks and hit the target with her 
first shot. Ever since she has been denied a hunting license, even though she joins the men 
in their hunting parties. Remarking on this ongoing rejection she asserted, “most of all I 
detest being a female… nature is mistaken” (Grémaux, 1994, pp. 260-261). As Young 
commented on the gender dynamics: 
There is a double standard here: if there is dishonor associated with a socially 
accepted “male” beating an actual male at a male sport this would imply that there 
is in fact some hierarchial value system being imposed in which men still occupy a 
slightly higher position than “sworn virgins”, giving further evidence for these men-
women as occupying an undefined middle ground, a third gender. (Young, 2000, p. 
119) 
We may perhaps see a similar dynamic in the case of an unusually buxom sworn virgin 
named Linita, interviewed by Young. During the communist regime she was arrested as 
a political prisoner and thrown into the men’s prison where she endured extreme physical 
abuse, including having her teeth kicked in (Young, 2000, p. 90). 
In the realm of economics the masculine prerogatives of sworn virgins could be 
more imagined than real.  Unlike normal women, virgins could inherit real estate. But as 
was the case with our adopted sons above: 
Such a social male enjoyed usufruct of the paternal property until his dying day, a 
right shared by marriageable females until their wedding and by returning widows 
and divorcées… The tobelija was expected to safeguard the property until his final 
hour, as it was to be handed down to the legal male heirs, preferably agnatic 
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relatives. This means that a social male was merely inheriting without being entitled 
to act as testator, as neither alienating real estate during one’s lifetime nor 
bequeathing it at will was allowed. (Grémaux, 1994, p. 278, my emphasis ) 
Sometimes gender ambiguity was simply a matter of female biology exerting itself. 
When the virgin Xhema entered the hospital to be treated for breast cancer, the personnel 
asked her which ward she would prefer—men’s or women’s. She chose the women’s 
ward (Young, 2000, p. 89, n. 18). 
 
Virginity 
The importance of on-going chastity cannot be emphasized enough. The 
virgjinéshēs’ entire claim to male status and identity comes not so much from their 
clothing or hair styles or mannerisms, but, 
The assumption of masculine identity by a female generally required swearing to 
lifelong celibacy before a group of lineage elders. Violation of this oath, or later 
pregnancy of the “virgin”, was said to be punished by stoning or being burned alive, 
though there are no recorded cases of such punishments in my sources. 
(Dickemann, 1997, p. 198, my emphasis) 
It is for this reason that the besa is supposed to be taken by the young, either by 
parents at the birth of a vajze e betuar or a girl before marriage—the female must be a 
virgo intacta for the oath to be legitimate. Grémaux records only one exception: a Muslim 
Albanian named Badē who took the besa after the death of her husband (Grémaux, 1994, 
p. 276). Apparently widow can equal virgin. 
This oath of perpetual virginity is the sine-qua-non of the virgin’s masculine 
identity. This can be understood in three not mutually exclusive ways. A female is never 
so female as when engaging in reproductive sexuality, including intercourse and 
parturition. It is difficult to deny female biology and anatomy when one gives birth or 
lactates. Furthermore, the act of sex in Albania, like everything else it seems, is sexually 
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hierarchical, with the man literally and figurative on top. It is exceptionally difficult to 
accept a social male as an equal if she has already degraded herself as the object of another 
man’s sexual advances. 
Finally, and most importantly (as we shall see), biological males of the society will 
not relinquish control of the female sexual body. Feminine women are subjected to male 
sexual control through patriarchal marriage or economic exploitation via prostitution. 
This fact does not change for sworn virgins: Their acquisition of male gender and its 
prerogatives comes at the price of their chastity. They cannot be both “male” and sexually 




For this reason especially one must ask to what extent the virgjinéshē represent any 
kind of third gender. Horváth has contended that western scholars have inflicted a binary 
discourse onto these individuals, thus masking their fluid identity, “[B]y describing men-
women as ‘women’, they disciplined them into the binary Western gender discourse, their 
descriptions inconsistent with the native definition of those individuals’ role” (Horváth 
2009, p. 4). 
No one else seems to agree. Grémaux makes a few extremely pertinent observations 
on this account: 
[T]here are several indicators that their gendered role and identity were not 
altogether clear to others. The nouns… that comembers of the communities used in 
referring to them are of feminine grammatical gender. Nevertheless, in addressing 
these persons, especially those who vehemently insisted on being male, any allusion 
to femininity was usually omitted out of reverence or fear. 
Furthermore: 
Sometimes we also hear a “social man” declare self-assuredly, “I am a maiden with 
a man’s heart in my chest.” The combination of both genders is also apparent in a 
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term of reference such as momak djevojka (“boy-girls”) and in nicknames like 
muska Nevena (“male Nevena,” Nevena being a female name). Significantly, no 
recourse was made to the neuter gender in referring to these persons. Instead of the 
available Slavic personal pronoun ono (“it”), local folks commonly alternated 
between on (“he”) and ona (“she”) in referring to them, thus expressing the power 
of the binary gender concept. (Grémaux, 1994, p. 277) 
Rather than any third gender, Albanian sworn virgins are well known to be 
biological females who enjoy, in exchange for their femininity and sexuality, social 
masculine gender and semi-male prerogatives. I say “semi” because they clearly do not 
enjoy all the prerogatives of masculinity, including a sex life and progeny, full economic 
autonomy, and rites offered to the male dead. No one ever forgets that they are women, 
even if they hide their sex well enough that some members of their communities might 
not realize that they are female at all. Nevertheless, should they keep their vow of chastity, 
they are viewed and, for the most part, treated as honored men in their society. 
“Moreover,” says Young, “proscribing the ‘sworn virgins’ to a ‘third gender’, calling 
them transsexuals, transgendered or even cross-dressers are all concepts to which many 
Albanians, not least the ‘virgins’ themselves would certainly not subscribe” (Young, 
2000, p. 124). In other words, if we see a third gender or even fourth gender in the 
virgjinéshē, it is something that we are inflicting on them, rather than accepting them on 
their own terms. “That is, sworn virgins are socially men, not treated as some 
intermediate or third sex or gender” (Dickemann, 1997, p. 201, emphasis in original). 
 
Devadāsīs 
One category of females rarely discussed in terms of gender fluidity are the 
devadāsīs of southern India. The term “devadāsī” is actually a neologism, an umbrella 
term which encompasses a plethora of technical terms used since the Medieval period to 
refer to a category of female cult functionaries who marry a deity and perform specific 
functions in his/her cult and temple. (Vijaisri, 2004, p. 1)28 Priyadarshini Vijaisri groups 
 
28 On the history of terminology and the epigraphic evidence see Orr (2000). 
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modern (19th–21st centuries) devadāsīs into three basic categories: the Matangi, the least 
well-understood and least studied, who appear to have had shamanistic aspects to their 
religious role; the Sani/Sule (“classic” devadāsīs), the upper-class, well-educated, 
originally affluent cult functionaries who were trained in traditional music and dance and 
who enacted a host of specific tasks in the urban temples, often associated with the 
performing arts; and the Jogatis, the lower-class, rural devadāsīs who sang and played 
simple musical instruments as part of their religious functions (Vijaisri, 2004, pp. 94–96). 
As Vijaisri noted of these last: 
They were also expected to perform menial services in and around the temple, like 
cleaning the premises. One of the crucial functions they performed was “dharma 
prachara” or preaching religious ideas, by singing songs and dancing on certain 
occasions. Musical instruments associated with them were the chaudiki and the 
tambura. (Vijaisri, 2004, p. 96) 
For the sake of simplicity here, I shall focus on the latter two categories, calling the former 
sule29 and the latter jogati. “Devadāsī” applies to both. In all cases, the devadāsīs perform 
specified functions on the behalf of the deity, ranging (for the sule) from dancing and 
singing to entertain the god and his consort in the temple to pantomiming the rites 
performed by priests in the inner sanctum so pilgrims could see the actions; dancing 
and/or making music during public religious festivals; purifying the godhead and/or the 
temple/sanctuary; serving as witnesses to acts of religious devotion (bhakti); to seeking 
donations for the deity, especially among the jogatis. 
The girls who become devadāsīs are understood to be married to the deity whom 
they serve. In the case of the sule, this is usually either Vishnu or Shiva (by various local 
names), with the devadāsī herself embodying the presence of the consort goddess. For the 
jogatis, they are married to the goddess Yellamma—a manifestation of Lakshmi, a 
goddess of auspiciousness. The fact that no one seems to discuss gender-bending in the 
 
29 It is generally claimed that the word “sule” means “prostitute,” a part of the discourse that intends to 
argue that all devadāsīs are prostitutes. However, this definition emerged during a period when, in European 
languages, all technical terms pertaining to women who were not chaste mothers and wives and daughters 
were translated as “prostitute,” including the Mesopotamian naditu (a nun), the Greek hierodulos (a resident 
of sacred rather than royal land), and the Japanese geisha (artist). On this tendency, see Budin 
(forthcoming). 
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context of women married to a goddess is beyond me… The fact that the devadāsīs marry 
spouses who are immortal, and thus cannot die, means that the women themselves can 
never be widows, an exceptionally inauspicious status in Hindu culture. For this reason 
they have received the title Nityasumaṅgalī—“ever auspicious woman” (Kersenboom, 
2002). Typically, the girl who would become a devadāsī was the daughter—natural-born 
or adopted—of a devadāsī, and her dedication took place in pre-pubescence. As the rite 
occurred for a sule: 
The girl was married to the idol and the priest as the representative of the presiding 
deity tied the tali [marriage beads, something like a western wedding ring]. Later 
the girl was instructed in the art of dance and music. When the girl attained puberty, 
the formal ceremony of nuptial rites were performed and auspicious wedding songs 
celebrating the sexual union were sung before the “couple.” (Vijaisri, 2004, p. 90)30 
The dedication of a jogati is roughly similar, but with the role of priest replaced by that 
of another devadāsī: 
Dedication, like a Hindu marriage, is achieved through the tying of a necklace. In 
lieu of a groom, devadasis carry the goddess as a murti [idol] in a basket. The beads 
tied are distinctive red and white glass, worn only by those dedicated and taken off 
only in the rare case that they need to be purified from death pollution. The natal 
family typically bears the expense of the dedication, which is generally conducted 
by an elder devadasi acting in her priestly capacity. (Ramberg, 2014, p. 144) 
After dedication the devadāsī is free to engage in a sexual relationship with the man 
of her choosing. This is typically an affluent man of a higher caste—a so-called zaminder, 
who, in the case of the sule class, may have helped to defray the costs of her dedication 
ritual. The devadāsī might accept a “husband”/lover/patron with whom she maintained a 
long-term relationship (most jogatis interviewed by Lucinda Ramberg had no more than 
two in a lifetime, usually only one) (Ramberg, 2014, p. 29), or she might have a “trial” 
 
30 For a far more extensive discussion of the rites, see Kersenboom (2002). 
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relationship and be kept as a mistress for a designated period of time before actually 
choosing a life-partner (Kersenboom, 2002, p. 189). Often this male life-partner supports 
his devadāsī mistress, providing some percentage of her income. It was from these 
relationships that devadāsīs had children, including the daughters who would follow their 
devadāsī tradition (and sons who traditionally became professional musicians). If a patron 
is not a good provider, the devadāsī will leave him and find a better one (Ramberg, 2014, 
p. 167). 
While sule and jogati might be distinguished by class, education, and location 
(urban vs. rural), they are not technically divided by caste, as any caste technically has 
the right to dedicate daughters to a deity as a devadāsī. As noted by Saskia Kersenboom: 
One of the most basic errors is the reference to a devadasi and to her family as 
members of the “devadasi caste.” According to the devadasi informants themselves, 
there exists a devadāsī vṛtti (devadasi life) or a devadāsī muṛai (devadasi order, 
propriety, hereditary professional right), but not a devadāsī jāti (devadasi caste). 
(Kersenboom, 2002, p. 179)31 
Nevertheless, in modern times jogatis tend to be members of the Dalit, or out-caste 
communities. 
When it comes to gender-bending, it is interesting to note that in the late 19th and 
20th centuries it was assumed that families dedicated daughters because they had no male 
sons and thus wanted to give their daughters son status (which should sound rather 
familiar by now) (Ramberg, 2014, p. 196; Vijaisri, 2004, pp. 198 and 231). “The main 
object of dedicating a girl was construed as a need to perpetuate the family line in the 
absence of a male heir. And that she enjoyed certain privileges such as inheriting the 
property and performing the funeral rites which in a strict sense were the exclusive 
privilege of the male” (Vijaisri, 2004, p. 231). However, the “sonification” of devadāsī 
daughters could even take place in families where a male heir was present—a result of 
the greater status wielded by women in the devadāsī muṛai. Thus Ramberg: 
 
31 See also Marglin (1985, p. 83). 
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[E]ven in families with male children designated as sons—in which the patriline is 
secure—daughters are given to the devi. Sometimes… they become head of the 
household instead of their male brothers by virtue of their ability to better earn and 
sustain the kin network—that is, to successfully fulfill the obligations of sons… 
Another way in which the status of devadasis as sons is marked is in their right to 
inherit land. (Ramberg, 2014, p. 196) 
When a devadasi dies, the devadasis dress her like a bride with all the signs of a 
married woman. Her body is carried to the cremation ground by the sons (puamāne) 
of the whole group… It is the eldest daughter who must do the actions (kriyā), the 
most important of which is to bring the fire from the kitchen of the temple… and 
put it on the corpse’s face (mukhāgni)… But, of course, it is only among the 
devadasis that the daughter performs the funeral rites; for everyone else these must 
be performed by the eldest son. (Marglin, 1985, pp. 82–83)32 
Furthermore, the masculine identity of devadāsīs was not limited to their status as “sons”: 
They could also take on the status of “father.” As one jogati named Margawwa 
interviewed by Ramberg put it, it was she who fed and cared single-handedly for her 
children, and thus she was her children’s father (Ramberg, 2014, p. 200). A woman who 
worked for years with urban jogatis in Sangli, Maharastra—Meena Sesho—exclaimed in 
an interview with Ramberg: 
I had not realized the extent to which they are a man in the family. If I could have 
the status my brother has in my family, I would choose it in a minute. To think, all 
the years I have been with them and I didn’t even realize this. It is not just that they 
are like the man, they are the man. (Ramberg, 2014, p. 197, emphases in original) 
 
32 See also Nair (1994, p. 3159). 
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This gender-bending of daughters does not come about because of a lack of male 
heirs, as many devadāsīs have brothers. Rather, while they do not qualify as a caste per 
se (see above), the profession of devadāsī —both sule and jogati—does run in families, 
where the daughters become devadāsīs and the sons musicians. The prerogatives of 
sonship devolve onto daughters because the profession of devadāsī is seen as the 
dominant one in this category—they make more money, and have more prestige, than 
their menfolk. In a greater context, the devadāsī community is essentially matrilineal and 
matrifocal, much like the Japanese geisha, and for the same reason. As noted above, 
devadāsīs marry a deity, not a human male. They do, however, engage in long-term 
relationships with human males, and children do emerge from these relationships. These 
children, not born in official wedlock, are not recognized as members of their fathers’ 
families, but are instead deemed members of their maternal natal family. In short, family 
identity runs through the maternal line rather than the paternal. And just as daughters are 
underappreciated in strictly patriarchal/patrilineal families, so too are sons amongst the 
devadāsīs. 
It seems as though male filiation is minimized almost to the point of non-existence, 
both for the men and for the women. The tradition of the group is perpetuated 
through women, a son is… of secondary importance.  He was useful in that he could 
produce daughters. (Marglin, 1985, p. 82) 
Even those women who did not become devadasis enjoyed a considerably higher 
status than other categories of women under Hindu law in that their daughters 
inherited equal shares with the sons. In the cases of devadasis, however, “the 
children belong to the mothers, and the girls born or affiliated inherit her property, 
the male members only entitled to maintenance.” (Nair, 1994, p. 3161) 
 
Persecution 
Starting in the late 19th century and extending through 1947 (and even later) there 
was a concerted effort to drive the devadāsīs out of existence. Quite simply, the dominant 
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Hindu castes wanted to remove any construction of femaleness that did not conform to 
the image of the chaste, obedient, controlled wife (Vijaisri, 2004, passim; Nair, 1994, 
passim). The devadāsīs—who worked “outside the home,” were educated, artists, 
property-owning, sexually active outside of marriage—were the absolute antithesis of the 
patriarchal ideal. Two discourses competed to dislodge the devadāsīs from their 
professions. One was an attempt to argue that there was no orthodox justification for 
temple dancers in Hinduism. This line of argument proved difficult when religious 
experts brought forth highly regarded texts affirming the history and required temple 
duties of the devadāsīs: 
The “agamiks” entrusted with the task masterfully demonstrated, through citation 
from a genre of texts dealing with temple rituals, “Shaiva”, “Pancharatra”, 
“Vykhanasagamasastras”, that devadasis did indeed have specific services to render 
in the temple. From the moment they woke up, bathed and put on fresh clothes and 
adorned themselves with flowers, they spent the day participating in temple rituals 
which included waking up the deity with song and dance rituals, lighting the lamps 
in the evenings, and performing prescribed musical and dance oblations at set times. 
In addition, the agamiks said, the scriptures required them to perform a series of 
special rituals on specific days throughout the year. (Nair, 1994, pp. 3162–3163)33 
The more successful attack was to accuse the devadāsīs of being prostitutes, an 
attack most successfully led by the so-called reformer Methulakshmi Reddy in the early 
20th century. This argument was groundless—no devadāsī accepted money for sex—and 
opponents ranging from English colonial officers through the devadāsīs themselves 
countered the accusation vigorously. But the prostitution accusers had three powerful 
groups supporting them: Those striving for the “purity” of Indian women (such as Reddy 
and Mohandas Gandhi (!)), those who wished to claim their dance form (sadir) and hand 
it over to "proper" Brahmin girls to perform (Bharata Natyam), and the males of the 
devadāsī families who wanted to reclaim their masculinity (and property) from their 
sisters. In the end, the smear campaign championed by Reddy was successful: In 1947 
 
33 For an excruciatingly detailed account of these rites and rituals, see Kersenboom (2002, §§ II–III). 
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“The Madras Devadāsīs (Prevention of Dedication) Act” was published, making it illegal 
to marry girls to a deity and thus render them devadāsīs. Additional acts were passed 
throughout the country where the custom was relevant through the 1980s. The sule-class 
of devadāsī was annihilated; the much poorer jogati class continues to function under the 
radar.34 Worldwide the devadāsīs are understood to be prostitutes, occasionally sacred 
prostitutes, and even so-called anthropologists propagate the stereotype. Thus Nicolas 
Bradford claimed in his 1983 article “Transgenderism and the Cult of Yellamma: Heat, 
Sex, and Sickness in South Indian Ritual” published in the Journal of Anthropological 
Research, “In fact, the initiated devadasi cannot normally refuse right of sexual access to 
men, especially to the Yellamma temple priests” (Bradford, 1983, p. 315). Remarkably, 
no other anthropologist studying these women, especially Lucinda Ramberg, have made 
any similar observations. Nevertheless, and tragically, many former devadāsīs deprived 
of their inherited profession but not offered means to education or occupational 
rehabilitation have, in urban contexts, been driven to work in brothels. But this is an 
exception, and many of the jogati class continue to live their normal lives. But: 
In discourses of social reform, they are framed as prostitutes regardless of the actual 
circumstances of their sexual activity and sources of livelihood—the two usual 
arbiters of women’s status in this area… [A]lthough many jogatis work or have 
worked in brothels, many others spend their entire lives residing in their natal 
villages, where they may take a patron—usually an otherwise properly married 
man—with whom they have long-term if not lifelong exclusive sexual relations. 
Still others are single and celibate. Means of jogati livelihood vary across the span 
of life and come from among a variety of sources, including gifts from patrons, 
ritual prestations, vegetable marketing, and agricultural labor. 
Reformers familiar with local custom admitted knowledge of this range of sexual 
practices and economic means to me in interviews. This variation, however, did not 
 
34 See Ramberg (2014), Vijaisri (2004), and Nair (1994) for full documentation and historiography of this 
process. 
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In none of these cases is the masculine gender of the women in question free from 
the constraints of biological sex. The virgjinéshē are one of the most commonly cited 
examples of “third gender” in the modern scholarship (e.g. Justel 2016, p. 93; Knapp & 
Meskell, 1997, p. 186), and yet the data provided by anthropologists such as Grémaux 
and Young indicate that these women (often referred to with feminine grammatical forms 
when not directly in their presence) are constrained in their performance of masculinity 
in a way never expected from actual males. Furthermore, nothing in their behavior, dress, 
mannerisms is anything but the standard fare of men; there is nothing “third” about their 
gender performance. They are women acting as men. It is really quite binary. 
This is even more so for the female sons and fathers of Emar and Nuzi, who have 
their names preceded by the feminine name marker (a cuneiform symbol of the female 
genitalia) (really), and the documents in which their masculinity is established also tend 
to refer to their eventual marriages to men and their production of offspring. The “legal 
fiction” (Justel, 2016, p. 91) of their masculine gender is pro forma, a means of regulating 
property. We have no evidence that they changed their behavior in any way to fulfill their 
new masculine identity. There is no evidence of any “third” gender. 
If the women of Nuzi and Albania are female somewhat in spite of themselves, the 
devadāsīs are condemned by their sex. Functioning as matrilineal, economically 
advantaged, sexually active “career” women in a staunchly patriarchal system, the 
elements of their lives that granted them the most freedoms, the greatest contrasts with 
proper Indian wives, led to their reputation as whores and the annihilation of their way of 
life. There is no benefit of gender fluidity here, a reconsideration of binary sex. These 
women were persecuted by their own kind for being insufficiently feminine women 
(“feminine” here = “what men want”). 
For all these reasons I must disagree with Knapp and Meskell when they suggest 
that, “this plethora of new studies [pertaining to gender-benders like the sworn virgins] 
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relates to an opening up of the field, with studies from all sides challenging the assumptive 
structure of sexual dimorphism and the hegemony of the scientific paradigm” (Knapp & 
Meskell, 1997, p. 186). 
 
5. Sex and Feminism 
The south Indian devadāsī can be interestingly contrasted with another group of 
female gender-benders residing in the northern Indian district of Himmachai Pradesh, the 
so called sādhini, a feminine form of the masculine sādhu = “ascetic” (Phillimore, 1991, 
p. 332). These women comprised primarily of the Gaddi and Seok castes are quite similar 
in all respects to the virgjinéshē. While still virgins (kanyā or kūmarī) they have the 
opportunity to make a vow of permanent celibacy (for which reason they are occasionally 
likened to ascetics). The vow is utterly informal. The outward sign of their vow of 
celibacy is the cutting of their hair and the adoption of clothing that is essentially 
masculine in style (Phillimore, 1991, p. 332). In fact, her most distinctive outward 
features are her male dress and masculinized appearance (Phillimore, 2001, p. 37). 
According to Peter Phillimore, who knew of some 19 sādhini during his 
anthropological fieldwork in the 1980s (Phillimore, 1991, p. 334), the sādhin’s 
new identity offers her the liberty to act “like a man” in a variety of contexts. For 
instance, a sadhin may choose to sit with male kinsmen or neighbors if she wishes 
to smoke (either a hookah or cigarettes) during an interlude in a wedding or to pass 
time a few minutes in the course of everyday routines. Equally, she may undertake 
tasks usually considered as being for men alone, such as plowing or sowing crops. 
(Phillimore, 2001, p. 31) 
Again like the virgjinéshē (and devadāsī) she remains in her natal household where she 
shares her inheritance equally with her brothers. As her father’s heir, the sādhin has the 
right to perform the son’s role at his death, making necessary offerings (sraddha) for the 
well-being of his spirit and its proper entry into the realm of the ancestors. As Phillimore 
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notes, though, “Because the sadhin has no children herself, however, this spiritual benefit 
last no more than the one generation” (Phillimore, 2001, p. 33). 
Unlike the virgjinéshē, in spite of her masculine appearance, occupations, and 
interaction with males in the community, the sādhu is never considered to be anything 
other than biologically female and feminine gender in her society. She retains her 
feminine personal name, suffixed with the term “Devi”. Feminine grammatical terms are 
consistently used when speaking of/to her, as are female kinship terms. And unlike the 
virgjinéshē, while engaging in male tasks and labor, the sādhi might also partake of 
female labor as well (Phillimore, 2001, p. 32).35 
Four points to keep in mind:  
1) The notion of gender, and especially concepts such as “third” gender can be 
remarkably mutable from culture to culture. The “mannish women” of the 
Balkans who cause pronoun ambiguity and get political rights and careers 
denied to women live in a very different gendered reality than the sādhini, who 
are like them in every possible way from a gender and biological perspective; 
2) This does not change the fact that in both cases the women involved are still, 
ultimately, seen as women. The biological reality does not change; 
3) Neither group (or, for that matter, the devadāsīs) see themselves as any kind of 
alternative gender. They are women performing (for the most part) as men. Both 
sex and gender are still binary, just acted out in unusual fashion; 
4) “For the most part” because the women involved are still utterly, completely, 
and totally constrained in their sexuality, in a way that men are not. 
This is the crux of it. In NO instance are females permitted control over their own 
sexuality. Clauses pertaining to the marriage of daughters-as-sons in Mesopotamia 
continue to give even dead fathers control over their daughters’ sex lives. The virgjinéshē, 
the “sworn virgins,” are literally those who make a vow of chastity (for which, in 
exchange, they get to act like men). For refusing to allow men to control their sexuality, 
the devadāsīs are branded as whores, denied education and occupation, and outlawed. 
Even Phillimore notes that a core component of the sādin’s gender “freedom” is the 
handing over control of her sexuality: 
 
35 This reminds me of the Woody Allen joke that bisexuals get twice as many opportunities to date as 
straight people. Sādhini get twice as many chores. 
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The sadhin’s celibacy needs to be seen therefore as the cornerstone of the wider 
social (public) regulation of her sexuality, the only way to accommodate her 
unattachment through marriage, and the key to permitting her social visibility. The 
social control of a sadhin’s sexuality is subtly reinforced in ways which proclaim 
her status to be not simply nonsexual (in the sense that she refrains from sexuality) 
but asexual (in the sense that the possibility of a sexual persona is categorically 
denied). (Phillimore, 2001, p. 38) 
50 years into the Women’s Movement and women are still second-class citizens 
throughout the world, and much of women’s (and girls’) oppression comes from the 
desire to control their sexuality, their reproductive capabilities, their bodies, and their 
minds. Women in the United States are still fighting for the right to safe abortions, women 
in Japan had to wait 40 years for access to low-dose birth control pills, according to the 
World Health Organization and UNICEF some 200 million girls and women alive 
today—primarily in Africa— have been subjected to female genital mutilation36, and the 
Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai of Pakistan was shot in the head when she was 14 years 
old for standing up for girls’ right to education. Throughout world history women who 
have not been submissive to patriarchal structures and heterosexual monogamy have been 
declared prostitutes—the Mesopotamian ḫarimātu, Greek hetairai, Renaissance Italian 
cortigiane, the devadāsīs, the Algerian “women without men” (Jansen, 1987), the 
Japanese geisha. (Budin, Forthcoming, passim) 
It was once the task of feminism to address these problems. But we became 
distracted with the third wave. Instead of seeking an end to forced child marriages, we 
thought we might solve our problems by claiming that the focus, the object of the 
problems did not exist. Sexual binarism does not exist; thus, there is no such thing as a 
man or a woman.37 There are merely power dynamics. Once the world realizes this, all 




37 Personal anecdote: A few years ago the soon to be ex-wife of a friend decided to get into gender studies. 
She quickly came to two obvious, irrefutable conclusions: 1) There is no such thing as binary sex or gender 
and all such categories are fluid and dynamic; 2) Men are assholes.  She never saw the contradiction. 
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expression of first-world privilege. While we fight for our inalienable right to have people 
refer to us as “they/them/their” and to have multi-gender toilets, our suffragette 
foremothers were beaten in the streets while demonstrating for the right to vote, women 
in under the Taliban in Afghanistan had their right to life handed over to their husbands, 
and for women on the Indian subcontinent having acid thrown onto their faces is still a 
“family matter”. 
The study of women and gender and men (let’s never fool ourselves into believing 
that men are normal) in history, including ancient history, has never been so important. It 
is critical that we understand the origins of sexism, misogyny, and heteronormativity, as 
well as different ways of seeing and constructing gender identity. But we must go into 
such study with clear minds. We cannot keep imposing third and fourth genders and sexes 
onto antiquity. We cannot force the ancients to manifest the gender identities and 
dynamics that we then want to “recreate” for ourselves. We make casual references to X 
chromosomes and Balkan virgins to substantiate our own idealized versions of a sexless, 
genderless reality, without really considering either the science or the subjectivities 
involved. The purpose of Theory is to force us out of comfortable modes of thinking, of 
believing that how we see the world is how everyone experiences it. Theory makes us 
question, confront, and reconsider our perception of truth and reality, telling us not to 
believe everything we think. This is good. But when it turns on itself, when it causes us 
to force others into our current modes of thinking (wishing), then it is time to stop and 
reconsider. 
So here’s a radical idea. How about instead of dicking around deciding what our 
pronouns are going to be and how many genders we think they should have had in ancient 
Nubia and whether they were hegemonic or not, we concentrate our efforts on getting 
girls around the globe educated, safely, and giving women control over their own bodies, 
even when they want to have sex, on their own terms, for fun? Let us learn from ancient 
precedents and alternative ways of being without trying to force our own agendas. The 
scholarship on sex and gender needs to clear its head. 
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SEXO E GÊNERO E SEXO 
Stephanie Lynn Budin 
RESUMO 
Este artigo desafia algumas das noções vigentes referentes ao sexo não-
binário e sexo fluido na academia moderna. Começando com um olhar sobre 
a história do debate sexo versus gênero, se volta aos estudos da genética para 
determinar como o sexo binário é definido, derrubando muitas crenças atuais 
sobre as bases biológicas de múltiplos sexos. Em seguida, considera-se quatro 
estudos de caso do chamado gênero fluido na história mundial - mulheres da 
Mesopotâmia como homens, virgjinéshē albanesa e devadāsīs e sādhini 
indianas - que mostram que essas "mulheres masculinas" nunca perdem seu 
gênero feminino, apesar das prerrogativas masculinas provisórias. Em todos 
os casos, é a sua sexualidade que os vincula ao seu gênero. O artigo termina 
com uma consideração de como a adoção irrefletida de sexo não binário e 
gênero fluido compromete os objetivos do feminismo. 
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